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1 
Argument
Appellant St. Mark’s Hospital respectfully submits this reply brief in 
support of its appeal in this consolidated case. As explained in its opening brief, 
these cases—and the thousand-plus essentially identical medical malpractice cases 
that are expected to follow—are all time-barred on their face, and the Appellees 
(the “Patients”) have failed to plead sufficient facts to overcome the time bar. 
In their response brief, the Patients attempt to lower their burden 
considerably, proposing a pleading standard that is essentially no standard at all. 
The Court should reverse the decisions of the district courts below, insofar as they 
rejected application of the four-year statute of repose to bar these claims, and 
should hold that the Patients have not met the well-established pleading standard 
to overcome the time bar in their facially stale cases.  
This ruling will provide significant guidance in these three cases and the 
thousand-plus cases that are anticipated to follow. This Court’s reversal of the 
district courts’ rulings in these three cases will reaffirm the importance and 
strength of the statute of repose bar as a vital legal protection to the diligent and 
dedicated health care providers in Utah who deserve repose from potential claims 
that have long gone stale, particularly when the plaintiff can make no specific 
allegations that would support removing the time bar. Such a ruling would also 
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best comport with the plain language of the medical malpractice statute of repose 
and the Utah Legislature’s intent in enacting that statute. 
Further, to the extent the other appellants in this case advance additional or 
supplementary arguments that support St. Mark’s claims for relief, St. Mark’s 
adopts those arguments as though stated herein. 
I. The Patients’ proposed pleading standard would effectively nullify the 
statute of repose.  
In their opposition brief, the Patients appropriately recognize that they have 
a statutory obligation to allege certain facts in their operative Complaint(s) to 
enable this otherwise facially time-barred litigation to proceed.1 The only issue 
remaining is what facts plaintiffs must allege when their claims are facially barred 
by the statute of repose. This is a critical question that bears directly on whether 
the healthcare malpractice statute of repose will have effectiveness in Utah going 
forward. 
One way to approach the question of “what facts” must be pleaded is to ask: 
what pleading standard would be meaningful? What pleading standard would 
protect health care providers from being confronted with stale claims, as intended 
by the legislature, while also allowing diligent plaintiffs who were legitimately 
and fraudulently prevented by those providers from discovering their claims to 
1 Br. of Appellees at 2 (stating “[a]s to the fraudulent concealment exception, the statute describes 
what allegations are necessary”); see generally id. at 29-35. 
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bring their claims?  The Patients’ proposed standard does not strike that 
balance. Their proposed standard would establish, in essence, that so long as a 
plaintiff recites “magic words”, they are entitled to discovery.  So long as they 
merely utter or write the words “affirmative acts” and “fraudulent concealment”, 
they’ve done enough. But that is no meaningful standard at all, and it is not 
consistent with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(c) and supporting case law, which 
require that fraud be pleaded with particularity in “all circumstances where the 
pleader alleges the kind of misrepresentations, omissions, or other deceptions 
covered by the term ‘fraud’ in its broadest dimension.” Williams v. State Farm Ins. 
Co., 656 P.2d 966, 967 (Utah 1982); Shah v. Intermountain Healthcare, Inc., 2013 UT 
App. 261 at ¶¶10, 12 (in pleading fraud, a plaintiff must identify the “who, what, 
when, where and how” of the fraud).  
The pleading standard of rule 9(c) is specifically designed to “deter filing 
exploratory suits with little information in the hopes that discovery will uncover 
information to support the allegations.” Id. (citing Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Bear 
Stearns & Co., 683 F.3d 239, 255 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Rule 9[c] [of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure] is designed, not only to put defendants on notice of alleged 
misconduct, but also to prevent fishing expeditions . . . .”); Cornejo v. JPMorgan 
Chase Bank, No. CV 11-4119 CAS(VBKx), 2012 WL 628179, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 
2012) (“Plaintiffs’ assertion that they will ‘not know until discovery’ the specific 
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misrepresentations made is precisely what Rule 9[c] [of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure] seeks to prevent.”)). 
In addition to being completely inconsistent with rule 9(c), a magic words 
test does not protect any health care provider from defending stale claims, any 
more than would a pleading standard that does not require the plaintiff to allege 
anything at all. The standard proposed by the Patients does nothing but create a 
roadmap to rendering the statute of repose meaningless in every case.   
But suppose the Patients are right that magic words and vague, conclusory 
allegations that simply track the bare language of the statute are all that is 
required. Even then, the Patients haven’t alleged—in any sensible fashion—that 
they were “prevented from discovering misconduct” because St. Mark’s 
“affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct.” Utah Code 
Ann. §78B-3-404(2)(b). The statute requires that allegation, and the Patients’ 
Complaints create no connection or link between the alleged “affirmative acts” of 
“fraudulent concealment” and the “prevention of discovery” because they do not 
allege that any of these patients did anything to discover or investigate their injury 
or had any interaction with anyone at St. Mark’s subsequent to their septal defect 
closure procedures.  
When convenient, the Patients claim they had no way to know their 
procedure was unnecessary before they saw lawyer advertising. But they also 
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allege in their Amended Complaints that it was well known that no one performed 
as many PFO procedures as Dr. Sorensen, and that the standard for PFO closure 
was well-established. (Br. of Appellees at 2-10.) If that were truly the case, it would 
not have been difficult for the Patients to investigate their claims if they had 
wanted to. Simply put, the Patients cannot allege “prevention of discovery” and 
therefore their claims fail.   
Although the Patients claim that all they need to do is allege the magic 
words to be entitled to discovery, they also say they have gone beyond that 
minimum requirement by alleging “specific” affirmative acts of fraudulent 
concealment. That is, they claim in their brief that they allege that Dr. Sorensen 
and St. Mark’s “falsified records” and doctored charts, and then concealed that 
conduct from the plaintiffs.2 (Br. of Appellees at 8-12, 30-35.) But because there are 
no allegations that St. Mark’s ever interacted with the Patients regarding their 
procedures, the generalized and vague allegation that St. Mark’s (somehow) 
doctored records of some patients is not an affirmative act that would prevent the 
2 In fact, the complaints really only make a broad, conclusory allegation that “Sorensen and St. 
Mark’s created false statements and documents to conceal the fact that Sorensen was performing 
medically unnecessary closures”, but then specify nothing as to St. Mark’s. Instead, the complaints  
state only that “[f]or instance, Sorensen often created medical charts that falsely reflected that the 
patients had suffered from, or were at risk of suffering from, recurrent cryptogenic stroke in order 
to get insurance to pay for the procedure” and that the “effort to disguise the true diagnosis and 
reason for the closures shows that Sorensen was always aware of and understood the true 
standard of care for these procedures.” (Bright R. 86, Merlo-Schmucker R. 100 (emphasis added).) 
But in spite of this lack of specificity in the pleadings, their brief on appeal frames these allegations 
as being fully directed towards both Dr. Sorenson and St. Mark’s. 
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plaintiff from discovering the injury.3 Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-404(2)(c). And, of 
course, none of these alleged “affirmative acts” or “fraudulent acts” of fraudulent 
concealment are stated with particularity, because they do not allege the required 
“who, what, when, where, and how” of the alleged fraudulent concealment. There 
are no allegations as to who at St. Mark’s doctored any charts or records, which 
patients’ records were doctored (let alone alleging that these patients’ records were 
doctored), or when, where, or how that occurred. 
The Patients seek to take a narrow exception to the statute of repose and 
dramatically expand it, such that the statue of repose would be essentially 
rendered meaningless. The Patients, of course, must take this position because 
their cases are plainly time-barred, and a logical application of the statute of repose 
and its narrow exceptions does not help them at all. A logical application of the 
exception found in section 78B-3-404(2)(c) indicates that the exception would 
apply only in a situation where the defendant did something directly to the plaintiff
that prevented her from discovering the alleged malpractice. That is, if the 
Patients, within four years of their surgical procedures, went to an administrator 
at St. Mark’s and said “I read these PFO closures are rarely performed, and only 
when there are multiple strokes.  I didn’t have multiple strokes.  What’s going 
3 There are no facts alleged that would support the allegation that St. Mark’s doctored the specific 
Patients’ records that would be at issue in this case. 
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on?” And then the hospital administrator said “oh, you did actually have multiple 
strokes” or “that data is all wrong and your surgery was fine.”4 The Patients did 
not—and never could—allege anything of the sort, and thus their claims cannot 
seek a common-sense or appropriate application of the exception. 
While vaguely alleging record falsification, the Patients repeatedly claim 
that any evidence of fraudulent concealment is exclusively in St. Mark’s 
possession, and therefore they cannot meet a heightened pleading standard and 
are entitled to conduct discovery. (Br. of Appellees at 51.) Again, this argument 
suffers from a logical deficit that shows how far removed it is from the common-
sense application of the exception. If there had been any affirmative act of 
fraudulent concealment by anyone with St. Mark’s that prevented the Patients 
from discovering their alleged injuries, the Patients themselves would know about 
it because they would have had the memorable experience of interacting with 
someone at St. Mark’s regarding their procedure, and they could allege that.  
The Patients’ argument that “silence” is somehow equivalent to affirmative 
fraudulent concealment in this context is yet a further effort to greatly weaken the 
statute of repose. (Br. of Appellees at 30-35.) Specifically, the Patients argue that 
the defendants “decided to modify the medical charts and conceal from rather 
4 Of course, because St. Mark’s merely provided a cath lab as the location for the surgeries, and 
the physician defendant was not an agent or employee of St. Mark’s, no administrator or other 
staff of St. Mark’s would be able to respond to any such inquiries. 
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than inform any of the patients who had received [a PFO or ASD closure surgery].” 
(Br. of Appellees at 31.) In making this argument, the Patients rely on Jensen I for 
the proposition that “silence under the circumstances” can “amount to an 
affirmation that a state of things exists which does not exist.” (Id. at 32 (quoting 
Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997) (“Jensen I”)). 
But the actions that constituted affirmative fraudulent concealment in  
Jensen I are entirely distinguishable from the lack of action alleged in these cases.5
In Jensen I, the patient, Shelly Hipwell, had been treated by a Dr. Healy. After 
Hipwell suffered a complication and was in a coma, Dr. Healy talked to his 
brother, attorney Healy, and encouraged attorney Healy to have the Healys’ sister, 
DeVries, contact Shelly’s family to suggest that they retain attorney Sharp. Jensen 
I, 944 P.2d at 329. DeVries was also Dr. Healy’s file clerk. Id.
Shelley’s family then retained attorney Sharp, as suggested by attorney 
Healy. Id. Attorney Healy and attorney Sharp had correspondence that “ma[de] 
clear that attorney Healy was communicating with Dr. Healy about attorney 
Sharp’s investigation and impl[ied] that attorney Sharp’s investigation of Dr. 
Healy’s treatment was to be minimal.” Id. Moreover, when attorney Sharp asked 
Dr. Healy for all of Shelly’s medical records, “Dr. Healy did not produce a copy of 
5 The Patients’ reliance on Jensen I is also misplaced because in that case, the statute of repose had 
not expired. 
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all medical records, but instead produced a selective set of documents that he 
personally reviewed.” Id.
Years later, when Shelly’s family brought suit, the various defendants—
including Dr. Healy—moved for summary judgment, arguing that the suit was 
barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 333. In response, Shelly’s family argued 
that the fraudulent concealment exception operated to save their claim from 
dismissal. Id. Under those facts, this Court concluded that there was a genuine 
dispute of material fact as to whether “Dr. Healy’s fraudulent concealment 
somehow prevented Shelley’s family” from timely filing suit, and therefore the 
trial court’s grant of summary judgment was reversed and remanded. Id. at 335. 
In the setting of those facts, this Court conducted an “in-depth discussion of 
the complex law of fraudulent concealment.” Id. at 333. It was in that discussion 
that this Court observed that remaining silent or otherwise acting to conceal 
material facts may sometimes amount to fraudulent concealment, but “[t]he 
party’s silence must amount to fraud, i.e., silence under the circumstances must 
amount to an affirmation that a state of things exists which does not exist, and the 
uninformed party must be deprived to the same extent as if a positive assertion 
had been made.” Id. (citing 37 Am.Jur.2d Fraud & Deceit § 145 (1968)).  
In Jensen I, though, Dr. Healy took multiple affirmative actions to divert 
attention away from his care and to deceive Shelly’s family: he contacted his 
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brother, attorney Healy, to orchestrate the family’s retention of a friendly attorney 
who would steer the focus away from Dr. Healy’s care. He engaged in continuing 
communications with attorney Healy about the suit. He responded only 
selectively to attorney Sharp’s request for all of Shelly’s records, personally 
reviewing her entire chart to select which records would be produced. Although 
Dr. Healy may not have directly communicated to Shelley’s family some 
misrepresentation that would lull them into inaction, the steps he took were 
nonetheless affirmative actions that may have caused the family to delay filing suit 
against Dr. Healy.  
In contrast, here the Patients’ only allegations against St. Mark’s are truly in 
the nature of inaction or omission.6 The Patients argue that St. Mark’s had “actual 
knowledge” of the supposedly clear standard for performing PFO closures and 
that Dr. Sorensen’s surgeries violated that clear standard, and then the hospital 
had to “decide whether to disclose it”—this was the “affirmative act” by St. Mark’s. 
(Br. of Appellees at 32.) The hospital’s thought process or decision-making 
process—followed by no affirmative steps—simply cannot be an affirmative 
action. See Chapman v. Primary Children’s Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Utah 1989).  
6 The Merlo-Schmucker court appropriately recognized that “[i]t is not clear from the Amended 
Complaint whether any Defendant acted affirmatively within the meaning of the statute to 
fraudulently conceal anything.” (Merlo R. 402.) That court also commented that “Defendants’ 
argument that inaction or omission by a defendant is not sufficient to overcome the time bar 
appears to be well taken.” (Id.) 
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It is undisputed that because the Patients’ claims arise from health care 
provided to them by the appellants, the claims are subject to the four-year statute 
of repose found in section 78B-3-404. The parties (and the district courts) all further 
acknowledge that Patients’ claims arose more than four years before suit was filed; 
that section 78B-3-404 applies to the Patients’ claims; and that to avoid being time-
barred, the delay in bringing their claims must have been due to St. Mark’s 
affirmative fraudulent concealment of their claims.  
But as the repose statute makes clear, the Patients’ claims can be saved from 
the statute of repose only if their complaints include allegations of affirmative, 
fraudulent concealment that prevented discovery of the malpractice. Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 9 and a long-settled body of dispositive case law make clear that 
“in alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” (Utah R. Civ. P. 9(c) (emphasis 
added).) In this case, the Patients’ attempts to plead around the statute of repose 
did not contain the “who, what, when, where, and how” of the alleged fraudulent 
concealment by St. Mark’s. In fact, even after amending their complaints, the 
Patients made no allegations of affirmative fraudulent concealment by St. Mark’s, 
let alone particularized allegations. Accordingly, the district courts erred in failing 
to dismiss the Patients’ complaints in their entirety because absent allegations of 
particularized facts establishing St. Mark’s affirmative fraudulent concealment, 
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their complaints failed to satisfy rule 9(c) and were barred by section 78B-3-
404(2)(b). 
The Patients’ proposed pleading standard would eliminate any teeth to the 
statute of repose; as the Bright court noted at oral argument, the Patients’ argument 
“turn[s] the statute of repose on its head”, and if the “failure to speak can be the 
affirmative act to fraudulently conceal . . . when would you ever have a claim 
barred under the statute of repose?” (Bright R. 688-89.) In the Patients’ view, vague 
and non-specific allegations of record falsification not tied to a specific patient in 
this case—or a specific defendant—plus silence to the patient population at large 
somehow equals “affirmative fraudulent concealment” sufficient to prevent a 
specific patient, who has demonstrated no interest in discovering a cause of action, 
from discovering that claim. Again, this is trying to create a roadmap to beating 
the statute of repose in every case, and would effectively eliminate the statute of 
repose altogether. 
II. The Foreign Object Exception Does Not Apply to This Case.
The Patients’ brief devotes considerable energy to arguing that the district 
court’s order can be affirmed under the “foreign object” exception to the statute of 
repose found in Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-404(2)(a) because, in their view, that 
exception applies whenever “a foreign object is wrongfully left in a patient’s 
body,” regardless of whether the patient was aware of its existence at the time of 
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the underlying procedure.7 (Br. of Appellees at 52.) The Tapp court8 sensibly 
recognized that the foreign object “exception does not apply on its face” because 
“the ‘device’ that was placed into [the Patients] was the precise device that was 
contemplated for the surgery[.] . . . It would be non-sensical to apply this statute 
to medical devices that were the very object of a patient’s surgery.” (Tapp R. 750 
(emphasis in original).)  
Specifically, the Patients focus on the term “wrongfully” to suggest that 
Utah’s repose statute is more broadly written than those of many states that have 
rejected this argument, and that the legislature’s use of “wrongfully” changes the 
outcome because that word “encompasses both negligent and intentional 
wrongdoing.” (Br. of Appellees at 56.) This interpretation should be rejected 
because it improperly seeks to define the legislature’s intent solely through the 
term “wrongfully” while ignoring or rendering inoperative the remaining parts 
and words in the statute.  
It is well-established that when interpreting statutory language, this Court’s 
“primary task is to give effect to the intent of the legislature.” Turner v. Staker & 
Parson Companies, 2012 UT 30, ¶12, 284 P.3d 600, 603. To do so, this Court will “look 
7The Patients did not plead this exception in their complaints or their amended complaints, nor 
did they raise this in opposition to their motions to dismiss. See Merlo-Schmucker R. 243-283 and 
Bright R. 255-281 (plaintiffs’ briefs in opposition to motions to dismiss amended complaints). 
8 The Bright and Merlo-Schmucker courts did not address the Patients’ “foreign object” arguments 
in their written rulings, perhaps because the exception so obviously did not apply. 
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first to the plain language of the statute and ‘presume that the legislature used 
each word advisedly and read each term according to its ordinary and accepted 
meaning.’” Id. Furthermore, “[w]herever possible, [this Court] [will] give effect to 
every word of a statute,” and will “avoid[]‘[a]ny interpretation which renders 
parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous.’” Id. And when the Court 
can “ascertain the intent of the legislature from the statutory terms alone, ‘no other 
interpretive tools are needed,’ and [the] task of statutory construction is typically 
at an end.” Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶10, 387 P.3d 1000, 1005. 
The foreign object exception to section 78B-3-404(2)(a) states in pertinent 
part:  
(a) “In an action where the allegation against the 
health care provider is that a foreign object has been 
wrongfully left within the patient’s body, the claim shall 
be barred unless commenced within one year after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of 
reasonable diligence should have discovered, the 
existence of the foreign object wrongfully left in the patient’s 
body, whichever first occurs.”
Id. (emphasis added). By its plain language, the only reasonable interpretation of 
the statute is that it is meant to apply to those narrow sets of claims where a patient 
subsequently discovers, years later, “the existence” of an unanticipated, 
unplanned “foreign object” that was never intended to be left in the patient’s body 
at the conclusion of their prior medical care or surgical procedure.  
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This interpretation is consistent with previous decisions of this Court over 
the course of the past half century. In Christiansen v. Rees, 436 P.2d 435 (Utah 1968), 
this Court described the types of facts that would give rise to the application of the 
foreign object exception to an otherwise time-barred claim, noting both the 
physician’s “negligence” in leaving a broken surgical needle in the patient’s body 
and the patient’s “ignorance” of that fact following the conclusion of the surgery. 
Specifically, and consistent with the plain language of the exception when read as 
a whole, this Court held that 
“where a foreign object is negligently left in the body of a 
patient during an operation and the patient is ignorant of the 
fact, and consequently of his right of action for 
malpractice, the cause of action does not accrue until the 
patient learned of the presence of such foreign object in his 
body.”
Id. (emphasis added); see also Day v. Meek, 1999 UT 28, ¶21, 976 P.2d 1202, 1208 
(describing claims eligible for application of the foreign object exception as those 
where healthcare providers “negligently leave [a] foreign object inside patients” 
whose presence was “not discovered for extended periods of time”). Thus, as these 
cases demonstrate, it is clear that the legislature intentionally sought to limit this 
exception to only those claims involving unknown objects negligently left and 
subsequently discovered in the patient’s body rather than to claims, like those 
asserted here, where a plaintiff who underwent a procedure that she knew 
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involved the insertion of a foreign object later asserts that that procedure should 
never have been performed in the first place.   
Nonetheless, in an effort to shoehorn their claims into this exception, the 
Patients argue that the use of the term “wrongfully” indicates that the Utah 
Legislature intended the exception to apply whenever a foreign object was left in a 
patient’s body, regardless of whether it was intentionally or unintentionally left 
there by the defendant healthcare provider, and regardless of whether the patient 
knew at the time of the procedure that it would be permanently implanted. (Br. of 
Appellees at 52, 54-57.) But this interpretation necessarily ignores the legislature’s 
use of plain and specific terms relating to the patient’s “discovery” of “the 
existence of the foreign object” that was “wrongfully left” in the patient’s body. 
Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-404(2)(a). 
In support of their position, Patients principally rely on cases from other 
jurisdictions interpreting those states’ repose statutes and foreign object 
exceptions. But these cases either support St. Mark’s position or are readily 
distinguishable. For example, in Hershley v. Brown, 655 S.W.2d 671, 675 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1983), the Missouri Court of Appeals explicitly recognized the critical 
distinction—for purposes of applying the foreign object exception—between 
claims arising from a unknown foreign object negligently left within a patient’s 
body, and claims arising from allegations where a known “foreign object” was 
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intentionally left behind during an underlying procedure that was alleged to have 
been negligently performed. The Hershley court explained, consistent with prior 
holdings of this Court, that    
“[t]o fall within this [foreign object] tolling provision, the 
petition must allege that the object was introduced and 
negligently permitted to remain in the body. This 
situation is distinguished from one in which the foreign object 
is intentionally introduced in the body and is intended to 
remain there, although the procedure itself is performed 
in a negligent manner. Negligence of the latter type does 
not fall within the [foreign object] tolling provision of § 
516.105.”
Id. (emphasis added). 
The other cases cited in the Patients’ brief are similarly distinguishable. In 
Norred v. Teaver, 740 S.E.2d 251 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013), unlike the case at bar, the 
foreign object exception applied because the patient did not discover that her 
physician had negligently left a cotton pellet in her body after performing a root 
canal, until she developed a subsequent infection requiring additional surgery. Id.
at 251-52. In contrast to the cases before this Court, in Norred the plaintiff did not 
allege that the cotton pellet was intended to remain in the tooth socket after a 
permanent crown was placed. Id. at 509. Instead, in that case the cotton pellet was 
more like the broken surgical needle in Christiansen or the retained surgical sponge 
in Day. 
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 Similarly, Beatman v. Gates, 521 N.E.2d 521 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987), is 
distinguishable. Beatman involved a claim where the intentionally-implanted IUD 
had subsequently been found to have been dislodged from what was believed to 
be its original location. The court found that the foreign object exception applied 
because the device was no longer serving its intended purpose and no longer 
belonged in the patient’s body. Id. at 523. 
 In Chambers v. Semmer, 197 S.W.3d 730, 734-35 (Tenn. 2006), the Tennessee 
Supreme Court explicitly distinguished its case, involving a hemoclip negligently 
left within the patient’s body without her knowledge, from claims such as this one, 
where the patient knew about the foreign object intentionally placed within her 
body. Id. at 734 (citing Hall v. Ervin, 642 S.W.2d 724 (Tenn. 1982), wherein the same 
court found that the foreign object exception did not apply to claims arising out of 
placement of IUD because the patient knew about the device, it was not 
inadvertently inserted, and the defendants’ negligence was instead based on the 
way the procedure was performed)).  
Thus, if any case from Tennessee is instructive here, it is Hall because at its 
core, Patients’ claims are not that the PFO closure devices were allowed to remain 
within their bodies when they should have been removed prior to the completion 
of the surgery, but rather that the procedures themselves—the underlying closure 
surgeries—should never have been performed at all.  
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Ultimately, this Court need look no further than the plain language of 
Utah’s foreign object exception to find that it was clearly intended to be applied 
only to those narrow sets of cases where a patient subsequently discovers the 
existence of an unanticipated, unplanned foreign object that was never intended 
to be left in the patient’s body at the conclusion of a prior surgical procedure. The 
exception was never intended to apply to the alleged discovery that it was 
wrongful that the device was left. These Patients all obviously knew that the 
device was left in them; that was the exact point of the procedure, to fix the septal 
defect with a closure device. The Patients’ interpretation would eliminate the 
statue of repose any time anything was placed in someone for medical benefit, 
such as  stents in arteries, metal plates, artificial hip joints, and the like, because 
the plaintiff could simply allege it was “wrongfully” done and avoid the clear 
repose bar.  
The foreign object argument is yet another example of the Patients—faced 
with an obviously time-barred case—attempting to dramatically expand a statute 
of repose exception, in order to allow a thousand-plus additional medical 
malpractice cases to proceed into discovery, at enormous cost to the parties in this 
case and with grave consequences to medical providers in Utah. Just as the Tapp
court did, this Court should find that section 78B-3-404(2)(b) does not apply to this 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons argued in all three appellants' briefs, the arguments of which 
St. Mark's adopts by reference, St. Mark's respectfully asks this Court to reverse 
the district courts' application of rules 12(b)(6) and 9(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Patients' claims are untimely under section 78B-3-404 and all 
remaining claims against St. Mark's should be dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this 7th day of June, 2019. 
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ERIC SC 
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